April 10, 2004

* Item: An alert FBI agent in Arizona notices a large number of middle-eastern males taking flight lessons at various commercial aviation schools. He is suspicious and reports his concerns to Washington. The report stops at a middle-manager’s desk. No action is taken, no inquiry commenced.

* Item: An alert FBI agent in Minnesota checking the background of a Moroccan born French national under arrest for an immigration violation notices that he has requested flight simulator training to control a jumbo-jet in flight and requests a warrant to examine the suspect’s computer. The request dies on a middle-manager’s desk. No action is taken, mo warrant is sought, no inquiry commenced.

* Item: When the G8 meets in Genoa extraordinary security measures are put in place to protect against a rumored terrorist attack. The expected attack is said to involve a suicide mission to crash an explosive laden small plane into the building in which the conference is to be held. Specific and well publicized steps are taken to intercept such an attack. No attack occurs.

* Item: In May 2001 intelligence indicates that Al Qaeda is actively infiltrating the United States via Canada intending to strike on US soil. That information does not reach the President until August 6th.

* Item: In early 2001 the FBI carries on more than 70 separate investigations of suspected terrorist sleeper cells in the United States. That information does not reach the President of the United States until August 6th.

* Item: In early August 2001 there was a report that Al Qaeda discussed using an aircraft to either bomb or crash into the American embassy in Nairobi as early as October 2000. That report apparently died on someone’s desk in the White House and was not seen by either the National Security Advisor or President until after the Twin Towers had fallen.

* Item: At the beginning of his month long holiday in Crawford, Texas, August 6th the President is given the PDB outlining the threat that Al Qaeda will strike within the United States. The National Security Advisor schedules the first principals meeting concerning terrorist for September 4th.

* Item: On September 4th 2001 the President issues the first National Security Directive of his Presidency. It concerns the nation’s defense against terrorism. One week later Al Qaeda struck.

All of that is in the public record. Those are some of the dots that our government failed to connect before September 11th 2001. In some cases the hints were vague and unspecific. In others they were direct and pointed. In all cases – except at Genoa – they were discounted or dismissed.

Ms. Rice makes the point, and accurately, that part of the problem is structural. Too much information, too many warnings were stopped short of the level at which decisions are made and action taken. Too many filters were in place between the raw data and the President. Too many middle-managers took action by doing nothing and passing nothing on.

Hindsight is 20-20 and easy to employ if one is playing the blame-game. Even the blame-game is important for in the adversarial debate of politics we sometimes, but not often enough, find truths that permit us to see clearly the changes we must make to permit us to exercise foresight. That is why the 911 Commission’s work is important and why should it content itself with assessing blame it will have failed in its mission.

Stripped of the partisan posturings and the circle the wagons spins the blame for 911 rests upon us all. It is a bi-partisan responsibility. From the bottom of the intelligence chain and all the way to the top – to the Presidents themselves we were all guilty of complacency. Even after the February 1993 successful attack on the World Trade Center we believed that we were immune to foreign terrorists and that belief reached to the highest levels. It still does.